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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
.~PACl-lE TANK LINES, INC.,
CO\YROY OIL COMPANY,
OR\'1LL1~ R. STEYENS,

Adrninistrntm of 0. H. Guyman
~;state,

CH.YSTAL B. GUYMAN

arnl P Al~L \V. COOK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs-

Case No.

10724

H~~ALL PIPE AND TANK
COHPORATION,

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case in its present posture is a suit for property
damagP, wherein the defendant contends that the courts
of the f-ltate of Utah have no personal jurisdiction over it.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'1 hP Seventh District Court in and for Carbon Coun1

l.1·, l IPnry Ruggeri, .Judge, granted defendant's Motion to
<~iu1slt

tltt> purported service of Summons upon it.
R1~Lll~F'

I(lW_

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

ltt>sJHmclPnt sc'eks an affirmance of the judgment be-

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief, \Ve sometirnes refer to the partit>s af' llii·:,
appeared in the court below. We have no particular
quarrel with the statement of facts set forth in A]JlH·I
lants' Brief. However, we believe that it rnay be helvful
to the court to set forth chronologically the facts which
we believe to be essential to a determination of the issm·
before the court. They are as follows:
1. Defendant regularly qualified to do business in
the State of Utah on or about May 3, 1961. (R. 13)

2. From about May 3, 1961, to October 1963, defendant maintained a salaried employee in the State of
Utah, and was actually engaged in business in the State
of Utah. In October 1963, said employee was withdrawn
from the State of Utah, and since that date "defendant
has not had any employee residing in the State of Utah;
has not maintained an office in the State of Utah; ha'
not had a telephone listing in the State of Utah; has not
had a licensed dealer in the State of Utah; has not had
anv franchised salesmen in the State of Utah; has had
no commission agents in the State of Utah; has not
maintained a bank account in the State of Utah; has n(Jt
advertised in any Utah publications; and has not conducted any business whatsoever in the State of Utah.''
(R. 13-14)
3. Defendant's certificate of authority to do business in the State of Utah was revoked by the Secretary
of State of Utah, pursuant to Section 16-10-117, PCA
1953, on February 28, 19fi+. (R.13, 56-57)

3

+.

I 'lain tiff Apache Tank Lines, Inc., an Idaho corporation, purchased a tank trailer from defendant out1:lidP tl1P State of Utah on or about April 2±, 196+. (R. 1-2,
l+)
:'i. On :N ovemher 1±, 19ti±, said trailer was involved

an accident which occurred in Price, Utah, allegedly
ii.-: a n»:,;ult of a <lef ect in 8aid trailer, causing property
(larnagL~ to the plaintiffs. (R. 2)
1n

Plaintiffs initiated the present action by filing
a Comvlaint in the District Court of Carbon 1Cou11.ty, on
DPcemher 31, 1965. (R. 6). The Secretary of State of
L- tah, as purported agent of defendant, was served on or
about February 16, 1966. (R. 9)
!i.

I.

of proeess was attacked by a Motion to
(~uash filed March 15, 1966, (R. 10) and argued to the
1·onrt 11ay 3, 1966. Following oral argument, the court
look tlw matter under advisement, and both sides sub111ittPd two written memoranda in support of their recopective iiositions. These memoranda have been included
in tlw reeord on appeal and may be found at pages R.
Hi-22; 2-1:-30; 31-36; and 38-41.
St~1·vice

.J nly 22, 1966, Judge Ruggeri handed down a
1·arPfull~· considered memorandum decision, wherein he
a11alyzc'd the positions of both parties, and then granted
defondant's Motion to Quash and ordered the purported
:-;1·rvi<'P of :·rnnunons quashed. This decision was desig11<tl('d li~· respondent to be included in the record on apJ t1·a l.
l H. ;)5) The decision was belatedly attached to the
( )n
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record, but has not bet>n numbered as a part thPn·of. \\'r
quote from the decision at p. 7, lines 3-13 as follow~:
''The court finds that the defondant had Jon"
ceased to do business in the State of l 'tali at th~·
times complained of by the plaintiffs; that th1·
defendant was not present in the State of 1itah
at the time the purported serviee of summons ,rn,
made upon it; that the defendant was not do in~
business in the State of Utah at the times corn
plained of by the plaintiffs; that the caus1, of
action, if any, did not accrue during an~' ti1111·
that the defendant was doing business in the tltatr·
of Utah, and that the defendant was not doing
business in the State of Utah when process wa~
served upon the Secretary of State."
The court's decision was subsequently embodied in
a formal order. (R. 47)
ARGUMENT
The narrow legal issue presented to the court by this
case is whether a foreign corporation whose certificate
of autl10rit~, to do business in the State of Utah has been
revoked pursuant to Section 16-10-117 remains subject
to the ;jurisdiction of the Utah courts for claimed liabilities arising out of transactions occurring after the dafr
of revocation and outside of the State of Utah, or ·whether
said corporation remains subject to the jurisdiction of
tht> Utah <.'.omts until such time as it makes a voluntan·
withdrawel pursuant to the provisions of Section Hi-llJ115. Plaintiffs contend that defendant, having once
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, remains
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, even

5
\li1J11glt ib C('.l'tificate of authority has been revoked, and

though it completely withdraws and ceases from all
c.orporatt~ aetivity in the State, until such time as it
('ompliPs with the procedural requirements of Section
lii-10-113. 1t is defendant's position that revocation of
its c<~rtificate of authority under the provisions of Section 1()-10-117 accomplishes exactly the same result as
\rnuld a voluntary withdrawal under Section 16-10-115.
To put the matter bluntly, it makes little difference
\\h<·thcr a person is deported by the state or leaves voluntarily, he is, in either event, equally absent.
l'Vl'll

\Y P sPe no basis for the distinction attempted to be

drawn by the plaintiffs. The Corporation Act provides
two methods for termination of the right of a foreign
<·nrporation to do business in the State of Utah. One is
by a voluntary withdrawal under the provisions of Section 16-10-115. The consequences of a voluntary withdrawal are set forth in the last sentence of Section
1G-10-llG, as follows: "Upon the issuance of such certific-ate of withdrawal, the authority of the corporation to
hansaet business in this state shall cease.'' A second pro<'<•<lun• is provided by revocation of authority by the
;-.i<'l'rdary of State under the terms of Section 16-10-117.
'l'h1~ c01u-wquences of this action are set forth in the last
s(·ntt-ucp of Section 16-10-118 in language essentially
1<lPntical to that of Section 116, as follows: "Upon the
issuaneP of sueh certificate of revocation, the authority
ul' tlt\' corporation to transact business in this state shall
1'1.'aSl'.''
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While we do not contend that a corporation whose
certificate has been revoked by the Secretary of Stat~
for any of the reasons set forth in Section lG-10-lli
should be in an advantaged position over a foreign corporation which has withdrawn under Section 16-10-115I
we can see no reason why it should be in c. disadvantaged
position either. The consequences as spelled out by the
legislature appear to be the same in either event.
Plaintiffs place heavy reliance on that portion of
Section 1'6-10-111, which reads as follows:
"Whenever a foreign corporation authorized
to transact business in this state shall fail to
appoint or maintain a registered agent in this
state, or whenever any such registered agent
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the
registered office, or whenever the certificate of
authority of a foreign corporation shall be suspended or revoked, then the secretary of state
shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom
any such process, notice, or demand may be
served."
We do not interpret this to mean that in every situation
where the certificate of a foreign corporation has been
~mspended or revoked it remains subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts by service upon the Secretary of
State. A more reasonable interpretation is that in those
situations where it is properly subject to the jurisdiction
of the Utah courts (e.g. as for acts committed during the
period it was in good standing, or where it may have
continued unlawfully to do business in the state after
revocation of its certificate of Authority) it quite prop-
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,.rJ.\· ,.;lwuld be subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah
(:omts. 1£ven corporations ~which follow the procedure
of S(•ction 16-10-115 remain subject to the jurisdiction
of the l"tah courts for two years following their period
tJf withdrawal for a.ct::; comniitted during their period
of :;oocl standing.

We readily eoncede that this defendant would be
:mbject tu the jurisdiction of the Utah courts for any
liabillties which it might have incurred during the time
that it was in good standing in the State of Utah, or at
auy time ~when it was actually engaged in business in the
State of Utah, whether properly qualified or not. How('Ver, it is undisputed here that it had ceased to do busi1wst-l in the State of Utah before its certificate was revoked.
It it-l for this reason that the holding of this court
m Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association vs.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 7 Ut. 2d
:)GG, 32G P. 2d 899, cited and relied upon by appellants,
is not applicable here. In that case the foreign corporation had been properly qualified in Utah during the time
of the transactions out of which the claimed cause of
action aro:oe. Here the transaction occurred after the time
of the revocation of authority and cessation of doing
Lut-;iness within the state.
'rhe purchase by plaintiff Apache Tank Lines, Inc.
l'rorn ddendant was made out of the State of Utah and
afte1· thP time defendant's Certificate of Authority had
iiP<'n revoked. The accident out of which the claimed
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cause of action arose occurred after the Certificah, ut
Authority had been revoked.

It was not the intent or purpose of the above quoted
provision of Sec. 16-10-111 to make a corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts in perpetuity h)
reasons of failure to comply with 16-10-115. The withdrawal is accomplished equally effectually by submitting
to revocation by the Secretary of State.
The rule is stated in 23 Arn. Jur. 516, Foreign Corporations, ~500 ,as follows :

"* * * Jurisdiction cannot he obtained of a
foreign corporation by service on its designatrd
agent where the subject matter of the litigation
is a transaction taking place in another state,
after the corporation has \Vithdrawn or been expelled from the state, and has entirely ceased to
do business therein."
There is some mention in Appellants' Brief of the
"minimum contacts" rule, as enunciated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in such cases as International
Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 US 310. That case, and
others like it, have to do with situations where the defendant has never qualified to do business within the
state ' but J·urisdiction is claimed bv
. reason of the fact
that the defendant is actually transacting business within
the state, or has such "minimum contacts" with the state
that in fair play and justice it ought to defend in that
state. Those cases have no application to the facts here.
nor do they support the contentions of the Appellants.
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Ln sL·wral cases decided by this court, the defendant
l1ad unwh greater activity or "contacts" in the State of
Utah than did the defendant here at the time of the
transaction in l{Uestion and, yet, was held not to be subjn:t to tlw jurisdiction of the Utah courts. See Parke,
Dovis and ()o. vs. Fifth Judicial District Court, 93 Utah
217, 72 P. 2d 46G; Advamce-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc.,
cs. Stohl, 75 Utah 124, 283 P. 731; McGriff vs. Charles
Antell, /11c., 123 Utah 166, 256 P. 2d 703; Western Gas
Appliances, Inc., vs. Servel, Inc., 123 Utah 229, 257 P. 2d
%0; Dykes vs. Reliable Fitrniture & Carpet, 3 Utah 2d
~-l-!, 277 P. 2d 969; East Coast Discount Corporation vs.
Heyu11lds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 P. 2d 853; Thorpe Finamce
Corporution i:s. Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206.
'L'he::w cast's are discussed in some detail in our memorandum of authorities contained in the record at pages
2.J--30. At the time that memorandum was prepared,
which \\'as before oral argument on the Motion to Quash,
11·0 undPrstood that plaintiffs were relying on the "minimum contacts" rule. However, in their argument to the
(:011rt, both below and here, they have relied on their
vonstruction of the Corporation Code. We have, therefute, felt that no useful purpose would be served, by
ll'Jwating that discussion in this brief.

CONCLUSION
\:\Then defendant's Certificate of Authority was revoked by the Secretary of State, it, in effect, became a
1l•ln-1·Psident of the State of Utah, no longer subject to
tlH· .imisdiction of the Utah courts for acts or transac-
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tions occurring after its removal from the state. ~in~"
that date, it has transacted no business in the 8tate of
Utah, has not been within the State of Ptah, has had no
contacts whatsoever in the State of Utah, and is, therefore, immune from service in the State of Utah for
acts occurring after revocation of its Certificate of
Authority.
The judgment below should be affinned.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN & .JENSEN
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
1205 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

